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OWNERSHIP STRATEGY: A NEW GOVERNANCE MECHANISM FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP 
 
ABSTRACT 
A new strand of the corporate governance literature on ownership seems to be in the process 
of developing what might be considered the next generation of the concept of active ownership: 
responsible ownership. This paper aims to contribute to this strand of literature by addressing 
an element of responsible ownership that is not yet well developed: the collective actions by 
owners. We introduce what we have named an ownership strategy as a new governance 
mechanism for collective action and responsible ownership. Using data from semi-structured 
interviews with owners, board members, and non-executive insiders together with 
documentary analysis, we find support for the theoretical construction. Specifically, we find 
that the ownership strategy functions as a collaboration pact, which cultivates long-termism, 
and that the outcome is improved agency, i.e. that both the relationship between the owners 
and the directors and between the directors and management is improved due to better 
alignment. Results show that an ownership strategy is an effective corporate governance 
mechanism to promote long-term commitment of owners while minimizing agency problems 
and promoting trust between principals and principals and their agents. The findings indicate 
that an ownership strategy establishes a much needed long-term focus and commitment of 
owners while creating a sense of security among the board of directors that they are working 
within the will of their owners.   
Key words: Ownership; Ownership strategy; Collective action; Voice; Long-termism; 
Stewardship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two decades ago, large parts of the corporate governance literature on ownership focused on 
active ownership as a powerful solution to important aspects of the principal-agent problems 
that haunt the corporation as a corporate form. In hindsight, it is easy to see that this made a lot 
of sense after two or three preceding decades with high economic growth and increasingly 
sophisticated financial markets. In the US, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) famously argued for a 
corporate governance system that combines large ownership stakes with sufficient power and 
incentive to be active with appropriate minority shareholder protection. Active ownership, in 
this way, serves to maximize shareholder value, primarily by improving the governance of the 
various principal agent relations. In the UK, shareholder activism by institutional investor 
appeared prominently (e.g. Becht, Franks, Mayer, Rossi, 2009; Black & Coffee, 1994). 
Throughout the 1990s, in recognition of this, national corporate governance codes emphasising 
the importance of active ownership were introduced in numerous countries.  
 More recently, a new strand of the corporate governance literature on ownership 
seems to be in the process of developing what might be considered the next generation of the 
concept of active ownership: responsible ownership. Quoting Shakespeare from Romeo and 
Juliet: “A rose by any other name would smell as sweet”. In lieu of responsible ownership, 
Bolton and Samama (2013) introduce loyalty shares that provide an additional reward to 
shareholders if they have held on to their shares for a contractually specified period of time. 
This reward to loyalty serves to make engaged, long-term ownership, and long-term value 
creation more attractive. Mayer (2013) writes about committed ownership, and Mayer (2018) 
advocates that corporations are held accountable to a higher purpose than shareholder value 
maximization.1 The latter is closely related to the theory of the economics of higher purpose 
by Thakor and Quinn (2013, 2018). Hart and Zingales (2017) argue that maximization of 
shareholder welfare is not the same as shareholder value maximization and propose that 
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company and asset managers should pursue policies consistent with the preferences of their 
investors. 
What these contributions have in common is their attempt to curb the potentially 
dangerous forces of managerialism and the dominance of short-term financial interest at the 
expense of healthy longevity and good stakeholder relations. This paper aims to contribute to 
this strand of literature by addressing an element of responsible ownership that is not yet well 
developed: the collective actions by owners. We introduce what we have named an ownership 
strategy as a new governance mechanism for collective action and responsible ownership. 
Active ownership is most powerful and responsible when the intentions of the active ownership 
is coordinated, unidirectional, and in agreement with each other.  
While there seems to be momentum as far as institutional investors’ shareholder 
duties goes, practitioners and politicians are more resistance when it comes to other 
shareholders; perhaps because it is considered an interference with their property rights (in that 
respect, institutional investor are indeed different in that they are merely financial 
intermediaries). However, as the French said during the revolution: ils doivent envisager 
qu’une grande responsabilité est la suite inséparable d’un grand pouvoir, which translate into: 
they must consider that great responsibility is the inseparable continuation of great power. 
 Shareholders need something to keep them together, if they are serious about 
reclaiming control and practicing responsible ownership – and not all are of course. An 
ownership strategy, clearly expressing the will of owners, driven by purpose, anchored on 
shared values, is an addition to the corporate governance bundle that mitigates the 
consequences of incomplete contracts and taper problems from agency; principal-agent 
problems as well as principal-principal problem. It is different from a shareholder agreement 
in that its focus is not on the relationship between owners and how to settle potential disputes 
or disagreements but rather on uniting the owners around a set of principles, a strategy, which 
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then serves to improve the relationship between owners, their representatives in the board of 
directors, and the top management team.  
 Theoretically, we can say that an ownership strategy, as we present it here, 
combines a solution for Olson’s (1965) collective action problem with the prospects of voice 
in Hirschman’s (1970) terminology. The concept of an ownership strategy also appears in Wahl 
(2015). We add to his work by suggesting some theoretical structure to the idea, and by 
situating this mechanism in the corporate governance literature on ownership instead of at the 
crossroad between corporate governance and strategic management.  
Beyond the theoretical arguments for an ownership strategy, this paper also 
presents a case study of a firm that formulated and adopted such a strategy in 2012 in response 
to a significant loss of trust following some of its actions in the run-up to the financial crisis in 
2008 (Jonsdottir, 2018; Sigurjonsson et al., 2018). Using data from semi-structured interviews 
with owners, board members, and non-executive insiders together with documentary analysis, 
we find support for the theoretical construction and the associated research questions. 
Specifically, we find that the ownership strategy functions as a collaboration pact, which 
cultivates long-termism, and that the outcome is improved agency, i.e. that both the relationship 
between the owners and the directors (fewer principal-principal problems) and between the 
directors and management (fewer principal-agent problems) is improved due to better 
alignment. 
Our empirical method is inspired by the rare work of Tilba and McNulty (2013). 
Qualitative inquiry is not only a means to reconsider established theoretical ideas but also 
serves as a very useful practice for understanding the practical and theoretical composition of 
this new corporate governance mechanism. Adding to the scarce empirical literature that apply 
such a methodology might be considered a contribution in itself. In summary, our paper adds 
to the corporate governance literature by identifying the important role of ownership strategy 
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in promoting coordinated active ownership. As such, we contribute to the line of work that the 
studies by González and Calluzzo (2019) or Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) are examples of, 
where there is an openness to the fact that shareholders may have either homogenous or 
heterogeneous interests and may affect PA and PP problems at the firm.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The transformation of active ownership to committed and responsible ownership carries with 
it a change in the perception of the shareholder in a corporation; a change that goes from 
responsibility to the individual, over responsibility to a group or coalition (if shareholders are 
assumed to be cooperative; on the other hand, if they are non-cooperative, their responsibility 
is only to themselves), to responsibility to all owners – and potentially all stakeholders. In other 
words, it is a transformation of the purpose of ownership in a theoretical setting that rejects 
shareholder value maximization as an unambiguous, unquestionable dictum for all 
shareholders.  
This is in many ways a continuation of the transformation of the economy in the 
late 20th century identified by Useem (1996). The nature of this transformation has been a 
change away from management control and the managerial theories of the firm that were 
developed in the 1960s, where shareholder are ascribed no active role (Yarrow, 1976; Fama, 
1980), to shareholder control, where shareholder value has taken over as the main if not the 
only relevant criteria by which decisions are evaluated (Fligstein, 2001; Brown, 1998). This 
shift has taken away some of the managerial autonomy, without, however, necessarily reducing 
the overall agency costs, as conflicts between different groups of shareholders may arise in its 
place (e.g. Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). This is often neglected in the neoclassical flavoured 
principal-agent analysis, where shareholders are assumed to have identical preferences.  
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 To practice responsible ownership, we might benefit from new mechanisms, one 
of which may be the following: An ownership strategy is a governance mechanism that owners 
use to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between themselves and commit to a purpose and 
a common set of principles by which the firm should be run. In this way, the governance 
problem that the ownership strategy seeks to solve is the lack of a clear ownership mandate 
that in a mutually agreed way respects the many different ownership preferences. In other 
words, it holds the potential to limit free riding, reduce expropriation, and foster collective 
action and responsible ownership. We propose an ownership strategy as a way to formalize 
and institutionalize the mutual commitments to cooperation – in a way that can survive in an 
environment of non-cooperative behaviour – making it more general because of less restrictive 
assumptions.  
Why do we need to take the extra step of a formal strategy rather than the looser 
format of a voluntary coalition? Because it is a credible commitment to the common interests. 
Like donating the shares of a company to a foundation has been shown to serve as a credible 
commitment to a particular business purpose (Thomsen et al., 2018), the ownership strategy as 
well can be thought of in this way. A binding commitment, just like Odysseus, who, upon his 
return to Ithaka after the Trojan war, commands his sailors to bind him to the mast of his ship 
to prevent him from giving in to the fatal song of the sirens. The ownership strategy is the mast 
to which all shareholders are bound. Also to Williamson (1985, 1996), viable coalitions must 
incorporate mechanisms that bind their members to an acceptable level of co-operation. The 
ownership strategy is exactly such a mechanism.  
In the following, we set out to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of for this 
new mechanism. Specifically, we want to highlight some theoretical motives and outcomes.  
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Motives 
Dispersed ownership tends to discourage activism because of collective action problems, while 
high ownership concentration implies that decisions are effectively made by the incumbent 
block holders, which also deters activism from the smaller ones. In any case, decisions are not 
being made in a way that incorporates all ownership preferences. Responsible ownership 
should overcome both concerns – and formulating an ownership strategy is a way to achieve 
this. It implies both ownership rights as well as ownership responsibilities or shareholder duties 
– one of which is not to free ride on the larger owner and for the larger owner not to expropriate 
the smaller owners (Edmans, 2014). Working together to change the company in a better 
direction is responsible ownership, something we will return to later in our reading of 
Hirschman (1970). 
It is often assumed that all shareholders have the same interests and that the 
relevant conflict of interest is therefore between managers and shareholders. Hence, these 
models do not take into account the possibility that shareholders may have heterogeneous 
interests, perhaps based on different views on what represents sound strategy for the 
corporation, or larger shareholders’ ability to expropriate minority shareholders. Thus, there is 
room for developing these models so that they can account both for other mechanisms by which 
coalitions emerge and for other conflicts of interests.  
There are a number of studies that highlight that shareholder interest can be 
heterogeneous, which in turn leads to PP conflicts between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders (Young, Peng Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Jiang, 2008; Peng and 
Sauerwald, 2013). The findings of these studies suggest that the assumption that shareholder 
interests are homogenous may be flawed. Goranova and Ryan (2014) highlight that 
shareholders may differ along several dimensions, including: their investment horizons, 
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business relationships with the firm, portfolio considerations, and discrepancies between cash 
flow and voting rights.  
Even with homogeneous interests, active ownership may well be undersupplied. 
Shareholder activism can be seen as a public good; the costs for providing it are privately borne, 
but the benefits often accrue to all shareholders regardless of participation (Olson, 1965; 
Admati et al., 1994). Thus, for the typical minority shareholder, exit or passivity is usually a 
more attractive than costly voice. For Olsen, coming from the Berle and Means type of firm, 
the public good characteristic of shareholder activism ensures that it is generally undersupplied 
(op. cit.).  
Forming a coalition is one way to share the costs and make activism more 
attractive. A coalition of shareholders can also mitigate the problems of heterogeneity, but only 
for the shareholders in the coalition; for those outside the coalition, the situation may be better, 
due to the coalition’s ability to reduce principal-agent costs, but it may also be worse, due the 
coalition’s power to expropriate small, outside shareholders. It is difficult for coalitions to 
embrace all at the same time; the economic rationale, the requirement of identical perception 
of economic rationale.  
Coalitions can also be more or less fragile (partly a function of the social 
networks that this kind of shareholder activism is embedded in, as demonstrated by Black & 
Coffee, 1994). Since every potential coalition member knows well the incentives that exist, 
promises of co-operation among potential coalition members are not necessarily credible. And 
without this credibility, no intendedly rational individual is prepared to devote resources to a 
coalition that is unlikely to be viable. In the language of transaction cost economics, inputs 
devoted to a minority shareholder coalition are specific to that coalition and have little or no 
alternative use. At the same time, the benefits they potentially yield are uncertain ex ante. 
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In sum, the opportunity to form a coalition does not appear to be sufficient for 
collective action. An ownership strategy, on the other hand, is designed to do exactly that. From 
these observations, we state our first research question:  
 
Research question 1. How does an ownership strategy work as a collaboration 
pact? 
 
It is important for the formulation of an ownership strategy that owners use voice instead of 
simply exiting the company if they are unhappy about the way it is governed. Exit, we might 
say, emphasize the shareholder as an investor, whereas voice emphasize the shareholder as a 
committed and responsible owner. Alternatively, we might say that it marks the difference 
between purely performance orientation and conformance. The ownership strategy curbs free 
riding and requires active engagement in the design of the strategy.  
Hirschman’s (1970: 33) definition of voice: “voice has the function of alerting a 
firm or organization to its failings” and further that “voice is not exit but must include time for 
management to recuperate efficiency.” In other words, with voice comes patience and long-
termism.  
So, what might explain the emergence and viability of minority shareholder 
coalitions? A satisfactory explanation of why a collective reliance on the exit mechanism is 
replaced by a reliance on the voice mechanism by a group of minority shareholders must be 
able to account for two things: the rationale behind the group’s choice of voice-strategy, and 
the mechanisms that allow group members to commit to co-operation in a sufficiently credible 
manner. The rationale is the failure that Hirschman is writing about. The mechanism is the 
ownership strategy.  
From this we state our second research question: 
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Research question 2. How does an ownership strategy promote long-termism? 
 
Voice is demanding and expensive. For this reason, it is often replaced with exit. As Tilba and 
McNulty (2013) find, only very small number of well-resourced and internally managed 
pension funds are willing and able to express “voice” and exhibit ownership behaviour. Instead, 
their findings support the view that despite theoretical ideals, the ownership behaviour of 
institutional investors is more assumed than demonstrated. This finding further highlights the 
relevance of something like an ownership strategy. 
 
Outcomes 
We put forth two specific research questions regarding outcomes from an ownership strategy 
crafted on the two motives just outlined. One relates to the relationship between the owners 
and the board of directors, and the other relates to the relationship between the board of 
directors and management. Both research questions suggest that an ownership strategy 
improves the governance of the company.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) also emphasize the ability of shareholder activism (in 
our case coordinated and mutually committed – as oppose to coalitions) to mitigate agency 
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. At a general level, we might say 
that the ownership strategy serves to homogenise interests – or, alternatively, to work hard to 
find the union of interests – that in a sufficient way makes everyone happy to carry on as owners 
of the company. Not only will this reduce PA problems, but also PP-problems.  
It is important to improve the working conditions between the owners and the 
board of directors, so that the latter can cooperate constructively on advancing the company 
instead of battling different owner interests. Principal-principal costs arise when shareholder 
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interests are heterogeneous, and activists attempt to extract private benefits at the expense of 
other shareholders.     
Existing literature documents that non-activist shareholders that work together 
can add value to the firm. For example, past research suggests that coordination among non-
activist shareholders can improve merger outcomes (Huang, 2013) and reduce the odds of firm 
default (Chakraborty & Gantchev, 2013). Furthermore, analyzing institutional activism 
pursued by the Council of Institutional Investors (a group of public and private pension funds), 
Opler and Sokobin (1995) conclude that coordinated institutional activism creates shareholder 
value. Finally, Bauer, Moers, and Viehs (2015) examine the determinates of withdrawn 
shareholder proposals and find that firm management is more likely to proactively negotiate 
with the proposal sponsor and change governance practices when the sponsor shares 
similarities with the firm’s ownership base.   
González and Calluzzo (2019) who find that shareholder activists cluster to 
reduce the costs associated with activism campaigns, and, moreover, that their activism results 
in positive abnormal stock market returns (they also become more profitable), which they 
associate with reduced principal-agent costs as an outcome. They consider a more complex 
shareholder activism environment that includes potential PP costs. If clustered activism 
campaigns create PP costs, they may harm shareholder value. González and Calluzzo (2019) 
contribute to the understanding of the role of shareholder activism in corporate governance by 
considering that activists and smaller shareholders may have either homogenous or 
heterogeneous interests and may affect PA and PP problems at the firm. Thus arises our third 
research question: 
 
Research question 3. How does an ownership strategy align owners and 
directors? 
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  Second, the principal-agent relation between the board of directors and 
management will also improve because of having a well-crafted ownership strategy. 
Regardless of the ownership structure, a company with an ownership strategy will be able to 
give the owners’ representatives in the board of directors a clear mandate. It will remove the 
burden of being ownerless (Fama, 1980) and reduce managerial discretion (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
 There is a burgeoning literature on this specific relationship, which addresses the 
issue in too many aspects to review here. In any case, the concern is capture precisely by Katz 
and Niehoff (1998) when they ask if there is a difference in how firms compete if owners take 
an active role in setting strategy as opposed to when managers make all the decision. They state 
that the management literature is full of cases where managers choose strategies that ultimately 
diminish shareholder wealth and wonder if their decisions would be different if the owners 
were involved in strategic decisions and “suggest that oversight provided by owners links the 
implementation of corporate and functional strategies, thus resulting in enhanced firm 
performance” (op. cit.: 756).  
  
Research question 4. How does an ownership strategy align directors and 
managers? 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
The research rests mainly on qualitative research method to gain deeper knowledge of the 
research subject than is possible with quantitative analysis. Qualitative research method is 
primarily exploratory research. It was used here to gain an understanding of underlying 
reasons, opinions, and motivations (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998) for an ownership strategy as a 
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new corporate governance tool. Qualitative data provide insights into the problem and help to 
develop ideas or hypotheses for further research. Qualitative research methods are in fact 
interpretative and are based on the suggestion that reality is socially created.  
An approach to the subject matter was further obtained by means of induction, 
meaning that theories and hypotheses arose from the data itself, and were not presented at the 
beginning of the study (Eisendhardt & Graebner, 2007; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Justifying 
this approach and pointing to its importance, Bansal (2013, p. 127) goes as far as to say that 
“The present knowledge system in corporate governance is … out of balance: there is too much 
deductive theorizing and too little inductive.” Also, support for the use of this research method 
is found e.g. in Sjöstrand et al. (2016, p.18) “the poor documentation of practices within the 
field of governance is in fact an international problem that results from a lack of readily 
available data. Most studies on corporate governance are based on secondary data sources and 
official quantitative data” and the results from such studies are inconclusive and often have a 
rather limited explanatory power (Daily et al., 2003; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Huse, 2007). 
We thus aim to answer calls for in-depth qualitative studies of corporate governance (Bezemer 
et al., 2018). Because although qualitative studies in corporate governance have grown in 
number since 1990s, they still remain a fraction of published work in scholarly peer-reviewed 
journals (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas, 2013). Furthermore, using the public sector and the 
Icelandic energy and utility Reykjavík Energy is of relevance as research into the governance 
of public energy and utility companies is scarce and is thus an answer to a call for more specific 
research on local public utilities governance mechanisms (Calabrò et al., 2013; Farrell, 2005; 
Grossi & Reichard, 2008). 
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Single Case Study 
In addressing our research questions, we employed a case-based approach just as Bezemer et 
al. did in their 2018 study of boardroom decision-making and the influence of board chairs on 
director engagement. The empirical methodology is in fact twofold; the study of archival data 
and qualitative case work within the case company. Single case studies can richly describe the 
existence of a phenomenon (Siggelkow, 2007) and are particularly useful as we are examining 
new phenomena, and as Bezemer et al. (2018, p. 222) in a context that is not generally well 
understood (Bansal, 2013; Eisenhardt, 1989; McNulty et al., 2013).  
This is a relevant and enlightening case for a number of reasons. First, 
understanding what an ownership strategy is. That is to say, defining what seems to be a blurred 
definition of ownership strategy in the literature. Secondly, understanding what the goals of an 
ownership strategy are at a case company. That is to contribute to understanding the role of 
ownership strategy. Thirdly, understanding how an ownership strategy is executed within the 
case company and with what results. That is to say, introducing the ownership strategy in 
practice within the case company. A case study approach is suitable for this kind of inquiry as 
it is meant to explore and asking more explanatory “how” and “why” questions (Eisendhardt 
& Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2014).  
 
Data Sources  
Multiple sources of data were collected for obtaining a thorough understanding of the 
phenomena as well as for data triangulation. This included semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews, archival document analysis and field notes. According to Yin (2014), the use of 
multiple sources allows researchers to address a broader range of historical, behavioral and 
organizational issues. No single source obtains an overwhelming advantage over the others; 
rather, they are thought of as complementary and can be implemented in tandem.  
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Case Company and Interviewees 
The case company and whom to be interviewed were chosen by means of theoretical sampling. 
The case was selected because it is “particularly suitable for illuminating and extending 
relationships and logic among constructs” (Eisenhardt & Grabner, 2007, p. 27) and with 
reference to Patton (1990), this case was selected on the basis of a purposeful sampling as being 
an information rich case guided by taking advantage of the uniqueness of the specific case in 
question (Eisenhardt, 1989). The case company, Reykjavík Energy, is an Icelandic power- and 
utility-company, organized as a partnership and owned by three municipalities; the City of 
Reykjavík (93.5%), Akraneskaupstaður (5.5%) and Borgarbyggð (1%). RE is in fact a group 
consisting of a parent company and subsidiaries. Three subsidiaries are the face of RE’s 
activities for customers and working within different markets, both competitive markets and 
public utility. Interviewees were carefully selected with consideration of their role and 
expected contribution to uncovering the subject matter.  
For the purpose of this research, primary data was collected, further supporting 
the call in academia for researchers to open up the “black box” of board research (Pugliese et 
al., 2009) focusing on ownership strategy and the board’s role in strategy implementation. 
Interviews are a highly efficient way to gather rich, empirical data (Eisendhardt & Graebner, 
2007). The interviews were semi-structured and open-ended, lasting up to an hour, hour and a 
half. The formulation of interview questions was based on (Becker, 1998) who advises to ask 
how things happen, not why they happened. Becker (1998) says this kind of questioning being 
less constraining and giving people more leeway when invited to answer in a way that suits 
them. Also, based on Eisendhardt and Graebner (2007) as well as Yin (2014) the questions 
were meant to explore and thus more explanatory “how” and “why” questions were formulated. 
Probing was used to gain deeper understanding of interviewee’s answers. We interviewed key 
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governance players; a) owners’ representatives (that is to say managers/mayors of the 
municipalities, both former and current), b) board members (both former and current), and c) 
non-executive insiders (current employees in management team), a total of 12 interviewees. A 
key approach to mitigate data collection approaches that limit bias is using numerous and 
highly knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives 
(Eisendhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
 
Archival Documentary Analysis 
Written documents were an important source of information. Archival data included primary 
and secondary data. Secondary data included the Act on the case company, its partnership 
agreement, the ownership strategy and more. This secondary data was accessible via the 
internet. Primary data included in-house data such as reports on the compliance to ownership 
strategy, quality handbook data that pertain to ownership strategy, its implementation, minutes 
of meetings from board meetings and owners’ meetings.  
 
Data Collection 
Overall, data collection took place between June 2017 and December 2018. Archival data was 
collected from June 2017 until mid-year 2018. Participant observation and field notes were 
taken at that same time. Interviews were taken from August 2018 until December.  
A key approach to mitigate data collection approaches that limit bias is using 
numerous and highly knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from diverse 
perspectives (Eisendhardt & Graebner, 2007). We found however that we were reaching data 
saturation after 10 interviews, as further distinct themes did not appear. A total of 12 interviews 
were taken. They were taken at a location of the interviewees’ choice. The data was analyzed 
through grounded theory methodology or coding, a general method involving comparative 
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analyses for qualitative data. The idea is to order the text into meaningful themes. All 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and then coded.  Triangulation of evidence was used as 
means to gain more confidence in the results (Eisenhardt, 1989). For the purpose of 
triangulation as well as means to limit bias all three researchers were involved in the case study 
and interpretation of the empirical results.  
 
Limitations 
The case study has certain limitations, as well as theoretical and practical implications. From 
the standpoint of research method, qualitative research has been criticized for not being 
scientific enough, not putting forward theories that are tested and either sustained or disproven 
as with qualitative research method. However, we, as Bansal (2013, p. 130) are “strong 
proponent[s] of paradigmatic and theoretical plurality. Both approaches are important to build 
a robust system of knowledge.” From the standpoint of sampling and sampling size, the 
limitation is a small sample and representativeness. However, the case company was not picked 
randomly and for a good reason. “In fact, it is often desirable to choose a particular organization 
precisely because it is very special in the sense of allowing one to gain certain insights that 
other organizations would not be able to provide” (Siggelkow, 2007, p. 20). One must also 
keep in mind the lead author’s position towards the case company, namely that she is an 
employee. However, there are two other co-authors and researchers implicated with data 
generation and analysis and thus the possibility of this bias is limited. It is the goal of this 
research to increase learning and understanding of ownership strategy for both scholars and 
practitioners alike.  
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Data Analysis 
Data collection and analysis occurred concurrently. Initial data analysis began during the 
secondary data collection. The process of initial data analysis, comparing observational and 
documentary data and going back to the literature resulted in a systematic development of 
research themes and development of semi-structured interviews. Analysis of data was inductive 
as well as interpretive whereas we aimed at a deeper understanding of ownership strategy. 
NVivo 12.0, a qualitative research software, was used to assist and facilitate the analysis of the 
qualitative data. Figure 1 demonstrates the data analysis showing the codes (Nvivo nodes) and 
meaningful themes from which we developed the findings and the relationship between them 
to uncover the concept of ownership strategy. 
 
Figure 1: Data analysis 
 
 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The purpose of this research is to establish an understanding of an ownership strategy as a way 
to solve governance issues relating to principal-agent as well as principal-principal conflict 
while promoting trust, supporting long-termism, and fostering collaboration of owners. We 
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sought major stakeholders’ view of an ownership strategy in semi-structured open-ended 
interviews to uncover the role and an ownership strategy in practice at a case company.  
Below is table 1, presenting each theme and its coverage. We will now go through 
each theme and the results in the same order as presented in the table. The text relating to each 
theme refers to the results presented in the table. 
  
Table 1: Node / Theme coverage. 
 
 
Collaboration  
We started out by identifying the respondents view on collaboration between owners and if and 
how an ownership strategy had an effect. Research question 1 was: How does an ownership 
strategy works as a collaboration pact? Ownership strategy is namely that, a mechanism that 
explicitly expresses the will of the owners and guides their agents while minimizing the 
principal-principal conflict that sometime arises when the biggest owners uses its power to the 
detriment of the smaller owners. By agreeing on their mutual will, owners are collaborating. 
Coding the interviews and looking to see if ownership strategy supports or has negative effect 
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on collaboration of owners, we found strong evidence that the ownership strategy works as a 
collaboration pact between owners (232 instances or 92% as opposed to 21 instances or 8%), 
see table 1.  
The impetus for the formulation of an ownership strategy was amongst others the 
need to coordinate the will of the owners. In fact, one of our respondents, in the management 
team, called the ownership strategy “a constitution for this union of owners.” The need for 
collaboration, as expressed by a member of the board:  
… the impetus was in fact to coordinate the view of the owners, that relate to the 
role of the company and in fact to get the owners together … to set a framework 
for us [the board] to work within, a coordinated framework that all [owners] 
could agree upon.  
A member of the management team described the ownership strategy as clearly expressing the 
will of owners while promoting long time horizons and commitment of owners. All this while 
at the same time guiding their agents. The ownership strategy is not a standalone document as 
before mentioned. The compliance to it is written in the partnership agreement. The following 
quote describes and mentions all of the above:  
… there is of course much more determination when things are documented like 
this in one place and it is more difficult to make changes to it. And they [the 
owners] have as well in the partnership agreement decided how decision-making 
should be, they have determined it and the smaller owners have a lot to say about 
it, how it should be. And it has been formalized with the partnership agreement 
and the ownership strategy how the owners intend to make decisions, in both 
form and content. The owners have in fact tied their hands.  So it has been said, 
explicitly; we want things this way, we want it so and so and so. And you [the 
board] will have to show us, at an owners’ meeting, per a special agenda, once 
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a year- not just the traditional annual general meeting ... It is not enough that the 
board does it as usual. 
Member of the board also expressed the need for an ownership strategy for different companies 
as apparent by the different companies that make up the case company group. It is not only the 
need for coordination, collaboration or long-term focus that justifies the formulation of an 
ownership strategy, it is straight forward as described by another member of the management 
team: 
The owner owns the company. In this case three municipalities ... The owner 
should have a view of the company’s role, it should be clear, the basics of how to 
operate it and where it is headed, because the board of directors works within 
the owners’ authority.    
When asked directly if the ownership strategy could be seen as the owners’ being more 
committed owners, one respondent, an owners’ representative, said “… taking responsibility 
for the right things, and defining responsibility for others.”  
Even though the relationship between owners was considered being good, the 
inherent discussions regarding the formulation of an ownership strategy is good. Expressed by 
one of our respondents, a member of the boards: “… I think the relationship was always good 
but there is nothing wrong with formalizing it more.” Then, as expressed by a different member 
of the board: 
They [the owners] agreed on the role and essence of the company and certain 
matters regarding internal operations that they came to a consensus about. It is 
in that way it [the ownership strategy] reflects this will [of the owners]  
The mere fact that the owners of the case company found themselves formulating an ownership 
strategy suggest that other mechanisms or tools in the governance bundle were not enough. We 
thus explicitly asked about difference between shareholder agreements (this case partnership 
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agreement) and an ownership strategy. The difference between partnership agreement and 
ownership strategy as expressed by one of the owners’ representatives:  
… this was indeed an innovation. There are certain things in the partnership 
agreement, and that an ownership strategy does not replace. However, there was 
a considerable lack of vision in terms of separation of roles … see, it [the 
ownership strategy] is more compact. We at least thought that the partnership 
agreement did not state all those things, or to say we decided to do it in a way 
that we wanted to have a detailed ownership strategy, or let’s say clear, so that 
impartial or professional board members were perceptive about the owners’ 
vision.  
We wanted to make a governance structure that would be such that the owner[s] 
put forward an ownership strategy, […] lines that could be changed with changes 
to the ownership strategy, and that might not be at home in the partnership 
agreement, or shareholder agreement. We include [in the ownership strategy] 
decision-making such as unusual or vital and unusual decisions to be sent to 
owners. … So we were trying to make a system where the board could first and 
foremost focus on [the company], its interest, that the owner[s] were still in the 
role of laying […] lines but it would be done through arms-length structures but 
not by breathing down the neck of directors or be themselves on the board.  
A member of the management team described the difference between an ownership strategy 
and a partnership agreement in this way:  
… the partnership agreement frames in part WHAT people are doing, what role 
do the owners want this company to play, and then maybe at the same time what 
not. Ownership strategy is then more on the note HOW people are doing things, 
what points of view are guidelines and what to take care of – how you do it.  
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And another member of the management team put it this way: 
… the three owners agree on one voice towards the company, towards its board 
of directors. That is to say what is top-down, so to speak. But the partnership 
agreement is just about working together. The cooperation of owners.  
A member of the board about the distinction between ownership strategy and  
… firstly, shareholder agreements might be more formal papers … it is in fact a 
contract. So it is often something non-negotiable … 
Asked directly, a few of our respondents could come up with anything negative about the 
ownership strategy. As expressed by one of our respondents: 
I am having some difficulties talking about what could be the cons of an 
ownership strategy. But its pros are that all stakeholders, owners, employees and 
customers alike know what the company wants to stand for. That in my opinion 
is the biggest quality.  
What was mentioned as having possible negative effect was the threat that the ownership 
strategy would not be implemented, as described by one of the management team:  
The cons with having an ownership strategy (thinks)? I don’t see any cons per se, 
but there might be a risk that it succumbs, fades out, if people aren’t working 
regularly with it.  
And one board member mentioned that the owners could use the ownership strategy better in 
coordinating themselves and said that “I think that the owners could put it to better use, in an 
engaging conversation amongst themselves” and the reason for them not doing so are more of 
a practical nature, that the discussions take such a long time:  
… discussions about the ownership strategy are of course supposed to take place 
between the owners. But I think, and I don’t know if there is, some fear that then 
someone is going to want to make some changes, I don’t know.  
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One inherently negative attitude towards the ownership strategy was that there were many 
companies well run that did not have an ownership strategy, as expressed by one respondent, 
and one only, a member of the board: 
 … there are many great companies in Iceland, that are very well run, that do not 
have an ownership strategy. The board formulates a strategy, but the owners 
appoint the board members so there is an equal sign between.  
To oppose his view one respondent, a member of the board as well, expressed his opinion in 
the success of the ownership strategy as an effective governance tool and creating trust:  
It has totally revolutionized the company’s corporate governance. Absolutely, 
and in fact it has been a prerequisite for the results we have achieved. I think in 
regards to coordination and just how the company is managed today. Just super 
effective management and I think, I think the main premise is ownership strategy, 
that it has been set and enforced. … it creates the framework for strategic 
management within the company. 
To summarize, we found overwhelming support for ownership strategy working as a 
collaboration pact between owners. In fact, one of our respondents went so far as to say that 
the implementation of ownership strategy had revolutionized the company’s governance. We 
think therefore it would suffice to say that our respondents were highly supportive of an 
ownership strategy as a collaboration pact and minimizing the likelihood of a principal-
principal conflict. We also wanted to understand the role an ownership strategy might have on 
promoting long-termism. This discussion follows.  
 
Long-term focus 
We have identified the important role of ownership commitment in promoting long-term 
corporate governance. Based on that it is significant to find remedies for short-termism. We 
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have suggested that an active ownership strategy, clearly expressing the will of owners, might 
be a corporate governance mechanism that can successfully promote long time horizons and 
committed long-term owners. Research question 2 (Hirschman) that we laid out was to uncover 
if and how an ownership strategy promotes long-termism? We found that long-term focus was 
deemed important by our respondents and the results showed that an ownership strategy has an 
inherent long term focus. Long termism is strongly supported by the interviews. We coded for 
74 instances (86%) that supported the view that ownership strategy had an inherent long term 
focus and 12 instances (14%) were respondents found that it had not (see table 1).  
One reasoning for the existence of an ownership strategy, or its importance, and 
how it benefits the company was laid out by one of our respondents in the management team. 
He was asked if an ownership strategy was both an owners’ strategy and a governance 
mechanism at the same time:  
Yes it is, but it is of course called an ownership strategy. It answers the questions: 
Why do the owners want to own this company and what do they expect from it? 
What is its role? That is the strategic factor. But then there is also a restriction 
of mandate [of the board]. That is to say, all vital decisions, whether financial or 
strategic decisions, the owners themselves have the last word.   
To clarify and reiterate, the ownership strategy limits the mandate of the board of directors by 
stipulating that certain decisions are subject to owners’ consent; i) new commitments exceeding 
5% of booked equity, ii) unusual and strategic altering or formulating decision or iii) plans to 
harness or utilize natural resources at intact areas and that require environmental-impact 
assessment. With this the owners are committed to collaborate on all long-term affecting 
decisions, as opposed to leaving those particular decisions to their board as is customary. As 
described by a respondent in the management team:     
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… I think it is an important, unusual document … It is very important as an 
[ownership] strategy; where we are headed, how the owners want the company 
to be run. Then it is of course, it is a safety net by limiting … the board of 
director’s mandate. The company will not be steered into trouble by decisions of 
the board alone. [At this point in the interview our respondent laughed and said]: 
Owners would all have to agree upon it being done!  
Our respondents confirmed the inherent long-term focus of the ownership strategy. One of the 
owner’s representatives described it this way:  
It describes the long-term focus and the will of owners. In the arms-length 
principle is also inherent that we want the members of the board to be working 
within the objectives laid out. And we want, first and foremost, that they have the 
best interest of the company in mind by following owners’ responsible vision for 
the long-term interest of the company.  
In addition to the long-term focus agreed upon by owners, the ownership strategy 
is a clear guideline and outline of the will of the owners towards the future, guiding the board 
of directors. An owner’s representative described this in a way that the ownership strategy:  
… sets it [the board] a framework. It sets it a strategic framework. This is a part 
of steadfast strategic thinking, over a longer period of time and not to have to be 
in any detailed management.  Our will as owners is clear and if the board of 
directors estimates, based on company interests, that the [ownership] strategy is 
wrong or if they want to go another path then they have to get an approval for it 
by suggesting changes in the ownership strategy itself or some deviation from it.   
This view was supported by a member of the board who said:  
The ownership strategy paints certain broad lines … or the framework that we 
are supposed to run the company within. And that clearly is for the long term.  
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If short-termism is understood as to the detriment to the company then long-termism is 
important. Ownership strategy is deemed by interviewees to have an inherent long-term focus 
and is thus important for the company and its future, and is in fact a protection for the company 
so that a new board of directors does not suddenly or swiftly change the course of the company, 
to its detriment. This is evident as one member of the board said:  
… this is a certain protection for the company for the long run. … the pros are in 
my opinion indisputable. They establish clear limits the board should work 
within. And that is enormously important. We can lean into the ownership 
strategy. It establishes a certain framework and that helps with all management 
… the ownership strategy assures a long-term focus which helps us to frame the 
operations and prevents us from running towards something that really does not 
concern the company, that we do not take company in any directions that might 
put it at risk.  
Restrictions on owners were also mentioned in relation to payments of dividends. The 
ownership strategy states that the board of directors shall formulate a dividends policy that the 
owners shall review and accept. That has in fact been done and with restrictions on when 
dividends are paid out, certain criterion that has to be met in order for dividends payments. One 
respondent said that the birth of a dividends policy, based on the ownership strategy, was the 
birth of a new methodology for ensuring the company being on the right path towards its future. 
While doing this the ownership strategy thus also puts a constraint on the owners themselves 
as they have decided upon the future path of the company and do not allow swift decisions 
disturbing the running of it. One respondent, an owner’s representative voiced this in regards 
to dividend payments;  
… now there is some methodology, that by itself is allowed to evolve over time, 
but it is based on something real, not just the owner's need for some money or 
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the company's willingness or lack thereof to hand it over, rather it is, it has been 
weighed and contemplated … 
Opinions expressed relating to ownership strategy not supporting long-termism were not 
strong, definite nor many. These opinions related more to the fact that owners needed to stay 
alert in regards to changes the future might bring. One owner’s representative said that:  
… people have to be ready and able to say “we have to respond to …” either 
changes in the vision for the future or different circumstances. People cannot set 
the course too firmly.  
To summarize we set out to uncover if and how an ownership strategy affects the long-term 
commitment of owners. We found that it has an inherent long-term focus that the owners have 
agreed upon and that guides the board of directors. As discussed, committed ownership leads 
us to think that committed owners are focusing on their ownership for the long-term and are 
less likely to engage in short-termism. We wanted to see if an ownership strategy affected the 
alignment between the owners and their board of directors, not least because of the restriction 
of their mandate and how board members made sense of that. This discussion follows.    
 
Alignment between Owners and BOD 
We set out to see if an ownership strategy could be the owner’s way to minimize the principal-
agent conflict and the risk that managers might serve their own interests at the expense of the 
ones of the owners. This could be done by alignment between owners and the board of 
directors. Research question 3 was How does an ownership strategy align owners and 
directors? With that question we sought out to see if an ownership strategy was that corporate 
governance mechanism that actually expresses the will of the owners and guides their agents. 
In coding for the guidance of agents we searched for alignment between the owners’ will and 
their board of directors. The results showed that an ownership strategy creates an alignment 
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between the owners and their board of directors (137 instances (93%) confirm it against 10 
(7%) disconfirmed, see table 1).  
The ownership strategy outlines the will of the owners and creates a framework 
for the decision making of their board of directors. Therefore, in fact by following the 
ownership strategy the board of directors is working in line with their owners’ will. Board 
members expressed true appreciation for the ownership strategy and its guidance. As expressed 
by one of them: 
I think it would be much more difficult to be a member of the board without an 
ownership strategy … both because the owners, they think they know where the 
company is supposed to go forward and is going forward and the board of 
directors, or the members of the board, know where they are supposed to go with 
the company. So both stakeholders have some comfort for what they are doing is 
what is expected of them.  
The interviews uncovered that an ownership strategy gives members of the board more comfort 
that they are in fact working in line with their owners’ will. One might come to think that 
ownership strategy would do the opposite, give members of the boards a sense of distrust 
towards them because of the limitations on their mandate. However, instead of them feeling 
some kind of distrust it creates this comfort, a sense of trust. This made it easier for board 
members to make decisions and to work together. In fact one board members described is thus: 
“The spirit of the ownership strategy is apparent in the boardroom.” Another board member 
expressed the same inherent spirit and took a concrete example of how the board worked with 
the limitation on their mandate, and how the ownership strategy affects the strategic decision 
making of the board of directors directly. When asked how the ownership strategy affected his 
decision-making as a member of the board he responded:  
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Just in a variety of ways. It of course stipulates particular decisions. It maybe 
also conveys a certain spirit. Soon after it [the ownership strategy] was accepted, 
I remember there came up a matter, we were accepting something that was on 
this 5% limits [of book equity] and we were pointed out that it depended on how 
we would calculate it, we could be on either side of 5%. We just said that if there 
was any doubt, and this was some undisputed matter I think, we will just refer it 
to the owners. And it was good to have guidelines, and just the general spirit that 
here responsibility should be taken and if you think someone is exceeding himself 
then you can discuss that. 
Another board member also expressed the influence the ownership strategy had on board 
dynamics and said, asked if it somehow affected the dynamic of the board: “Yes! It does, it 
facilitates communications, it does.” The same board member iterated: 
...  because the ownership strategy creates these boundaries for us and that put 
its mark on discussions within the board, doing away with maybe some tension 
that would be if there was no ownership strategy. We could be arguing about 
matters that could overturn the company, if you see what I mean. We are dealing 
more with important matters, not foundational ones. And I think that in that sense 
it has in fact facilitated better communication within the board because it has 
made it clear what we are supposed, our framework, what we are supposed to be 
discussing. 
Board members in general expressed appreciation for the guidelines the ownership strategy 
provided them with and even the limitation on their mandate because it was in fact some 
assurance for board members that they were doing exactly what was asked of them:  
…as with the conditions, when decisions are subject to owners’ revision and 
such, there are of course three matters there, this is just really important because 
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then there is a certain assurance … of what is expected and the framework that I 
have to work within, and that the board has to work within.  
A member of the management team mentioned the restraint the ownership strategy must have 
for the board of directors and mentioned that a report on the compliance to the ownership 
strategy was a part of solid framework for corporate governance: 
… discussions arise when report on the compliance to ownership strategy is 
handed in, putting the ownership strategy in the spotlight. This of course makes 
for a solid and trustworthy framework for corporate governance, I think.  
Although limitations on the mandate of the board was not negative in the minds of the board 
members one described that an ownership strategy could not go too far in that sense. Inherently 
negative attitudes towards the ownership strategy were not coded. One respondent, a member 
of the management team was not sure if the case company’s ownership strategy was effective 
in the alignment of the owners and the board of directors. On respondent, a member of the 
board, expressed some concern that it might be possible to justify deviations from the 
ownership strategy or its inherent spirit  
To sum up, ownership strategy creates alignment between owners and their board 
of directors. It guides the board of directors so that they know where their owners want to go 
with the company. A restriction on the boards mandate was not seen as distrust or negative, 
rather, board members appreciated knowing exactly what the owners wanted from them. 
Ownership strategy strongly affects strategic management and the strategic decision-making 
of the board. Next level effect of ownership strategy would be from the board of directors 
towards management, which we will discuss next.  
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Alignment between BOD and Management 
For the board of directors and managers alike an ownership strategy clearly expresses the will 
of the owners making it clear what owners expect from them. The ownership strategy clearly 
expresses their guiding vision, the company role has been outlined by the owners as well as the 
core business. The board of directors sees this in a positive light, even though restrictions have 
been made in their mandate. We sought out to see if the ownership strategy had any effect on 
the alignment of the board of directors and the management team. Research question 4 we put 
forth was: how does an ownership strategy align directors and managers? 
The results show that an ownership strategy has a positive effect on the 
cooperation of the board and management (100%, no coding was made for an ownership 
having a negative effect on the alignment of the board and management, see table 1). One 
member of the management team described this alignment in this way: 
Managers get, through ownership strategy and the corporate strategy, a message 
in regards to where the company is headed. Where they are supposed to go, what 
they are supposed to do. They are supposed to set goals and measures, submit it 
to the board and in some instances submit it to the owners, and then go in that 
direction.  
A different member of the management team also described the alignment on not only the 
board and managers, but all employees:   
I think that all of us that work at Reykjavik Energy and the board of directors are 
true, are working within the spirit of what the owners want to see, without setting 
a scale to it I think that there is harmony between employees, managers, the board 
and owners in regards to the path of this company, the role and in what spirit we 
want to work. 
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This same member of the management team also said that an ownership strategy affected the 
governance of the group as a whole, not just the parent but the subsidiaries as well: 
… the boards that manage the companies [subsidiaries] and their managers, it 
being clear from the owners, what is expected of them. The role of the group, in 
the minds of the owners and what we should all have as a guiding light, what the 
core business is etc. …  
Our results support that an ownership strategy has a positive effect on the cooperation of the 
board and management. Clear and formal documentation of what the owners expect from the 
company enables the board and managers alike to work within the owners’ will. This creates a 
sense of comfort for the stakeholders that they are in fact working within the will and vision of 
their owners. This sense of comfort can be translated to trust, as we will next shed light on.  
 
Trust 
Ownership has a positive effect on trust among stakeholders. We coded for 60 instances 
whereas 59 of them (98%) supported that the ownership facilitated trust while only one instance 
(2%) was coded for negative attitude. This instance was though not inherently negative. In his 
opinion the ownership strategy was just as important, and not more important, that strategizing 
in general. He made no point of ownership strategy creating distrust. And while all respondents 
said that ownership strategy was important, this same respondent said that he thought it was, 
but a corporate strategy would do the same. He was alone in his opinion.  
Asked directly if the ownership strategy had affected trust between stakeholders 
most answers were quite clear, as one of the owners’ representative simply put it: “yes, 
increased trust a lot between stakeholders.” Another respondent, a member of the 
management, said:   
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…I think that it has [increased trust] without doubt. Both trust towards the 
company employees, trust of the owners towards the board of directors and the 
company in general.  
In part this had to do with the transparency the ownership strategy stipulates clearly. An 
owners’ representative put an emphasis on transparency when asked if the ownership strategy 
might affect trust and in what way: 
There is no question about it. When the flow of information is effective, you might 
tend to underestimate the need for it, and when you see things being organized, 
explained and introduced, that builds up a certain trust in that things are done in 
an organized manner and in accordance to this fundamental manifesto that the 
ownership strategy is. That kind of things, this interaction. That these are not just 
words on paper. This means that there is a certain comfort, or should we say a 
feeling of trust in that everyone sits at the same table, get information and 
everyone has every chance to ask for information and so on. It is important that 
this side of the coin is  
The empirical results strongly suggest that such an ownership strategy can be made out to 
increase trust. Owners having decided on a collective voice, having created a clear mandate for 
the board of directors and a guidance, for the board, managers and all employees alike, was 
seen in a positive light and increasing trust between stakeholders.   
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Empirical results show that an ownership strategy is an effective corporate governance 
mechanism to promote long-term commitment of owners while minimizing agency problems 
and promoting trust between principals and principals and their agents. To summarize, an 
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ownership strategy represents ownership as a unity where the owners speak with a collective 
voice. Theoretically, we can say that an ownership strategy combines a solution for Olson’s 
(1965) collective action problem with the prospects of voice in Hirschman’s (1970) 
terminology.  The results of the interviews support that of Wahl (2015) who says that an 
ownership strategy states the will of the owner. It enables the owners to express their will that 
they have together agreed upon explicitly, as Wahl (2015) suggests. We confirmed that an 
ownership strategy is a governance mechanism able to align the interest of owners and their 
agents and that “By combining owners’ will on one document, the ownership strategy gives 
one clear message from principals to agency instead of several signs” (Wahl, 2015, p. 95). 
Empirically, the research findings indicate that an ownership strategy establishes 
a much needed long-term focus and commitment of owners (Bolton and Samana, 2013; Mayer, 
2013, 2018; Thakor and Quinn, 2013, 2018; Hart and Zingales, 2017) while creating a sense 
of security among the board of directors that they are working within the will of their owners. 
Whereas ownership strategy conveys the will, vision and long-term focus of owners to the 
board of directors it affects strategic decision-making and dynamics of the board while 
promoting trust between stakeholders. Thus, it is a way to avoid the trap between companies 
being ownerless (Fama, 1980) and burdened by powerful and self-interested owners (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Edmans, 2014). The research findings therefore allow for a suggestion to 
be made for a new tool in the governance bundle for promoting collective action and 
responsible ownership. Active ownership is most powerful and responsible when the intentions 
of the active ownership is coordinated, unidirectional, and in agreement with each other. 
Our empirical research gives way to thinking that an ownership strategy is an 
important mechanism for different kinds of companies. It serves to seek out the homogeneous 
interests as well as the mutually acceptable heterogeneous interests (González and Calluzzo, 
2019; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012) – and thus also the expected 
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agreement amongst their respective representatives in the board. It is also a very generic 
mechanism in the sense that it makes no presumptions about the content; only that coordination 
is required (Olson, 1965), and that owners resort to patient voice instead of quick exit 
(Hirschman, 1970). For companies and their boards of directors it is important that the owners 
are clear on what they expect from their ownership. For the case company in question it is 
really important as it is organized a group of companies, parent and subsidiaries, that are 
working both competitively and serving as a public utility. The owners are however, the same 
for the group as a whole and it is of much importance that they give one clear message 
concerning what they want from their group of companies.  
Our research has a substantial explanatory power, introducing an ownership 
strategy as a corporate governance tool in action at a case company. In addition, although the 
results are not generalizable, we have added to the theorizing about ownership strategies. As 
with qualitative research, hypotheses arise from the data at the end of the study. This allows us 
to hypothesize that an ownership strategy is an effective governance tool to promote the 
cooperation between owners and establish their long-term focus. In doing so, owners and their 
board of directors are aligned as are the board and managers. A suggestion for further research 
is therefore to use a bigger sample and test if the hypothesis stands.  
 In addition, for companies with more owners, the discussion and formulation of 
an ownership strategy might be difficult. However, there are indications that an ownership 
strategy is an effective governance tool to establish a long-term focus and promote 
collaboration of owners while providing guiding vision for their board of directors. By limiting 
the mandate of the board and having long-term affecting decisions sent their way the owners 
are more committed.  
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ENDNOTES 
1 There is also an interest in this from the business community as well as politically. In Asia, for example, the 
Stewardship Asia Centre has published a stewardship code for institutional owners, where “the act of safeguarding 
and enhancing the capability of the business to create economic and societal value over time” is at the center of 
attention. In the European Union, amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive from 2007 was adopted in 
2017, putting more emphasis on the role of institutional shareholder engagement. 
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